倫理學
維基百科，自由的百科全書
倫理學是哲學的一個分支學科。
目錄 |
倫理學分類
歷史
顯示▼時期派系
基本概念
對自願性人類行爲所設的道德規範或規則。[1]理論
自然科學中(倫理問題)
生命科學與醫學方面
公共衞生方面
其它
參見
- ^ 藝術與建築索引典—倫理（概念） 於2011 年3 月21 日查閱
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本頁面最後修訂於2012年5月9日 (星期三) 10:19。
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http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hk/%E5%8A%9F%E5%88%A9%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89
功利主義
維基百科，自由的百科全書
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此條目沒有列出任何參考或來源。（2010年2月12日） 維基百科所有的內容都應該可供查證。 請協助添加來自可靠來源的引用以改善這篇條目。無法查證的內容可能被提出異議而移除。 |
目錄 |
發展
早在功利主義正式成為哲學理論之前，就有功利主義思想雛型的出現。西元前5世紀的亞里斯提卜(Aristippus)、前4世紀的伊比鳩魯、中國古代的墨子及其追隨者的倫理學中都存在着如何促使最大快樂的思維，他們是古人中的功利主義先驅。近代英國哲學家與倫理學家如坎伯蘭 (Richard Cumberland)、法蘭西斯·哈奇森與大衞·休謨都有功利主義的傾向。據邊沁指出，他在英國化學家約瑟夫·普利斯特裡、法國哲學家愛爾維修(Claude-Adrien Helvetius)、義大法學家貝卡里亞 (Cesare Beccaria) 以及休謨等的著作中都發現了功利原則。功利主義正式成為哲學系統是在18世紀末與19世紀初期，由英國哲學家兼經濟學家邊沁和米爾提出。其基本原則是：一種行為如有助於增進幸福，則為正確的；若導致產生和幸福相反的東西，則為錯誤的。幸福不僅涉及行為的當事人，也涉及受該行為影響的每一個人。
19世紀末期的功利主義代表人物亨利·西奇威克(Henry Sidgwick)認為功利主義來自對「常識」的道德系統的反省。他論證多數的常識道德被要求建立在功利主義基礎上。他也認為功利主義能解決常識學說的模糊和前後矛盾而產生的困難和困惑之處。在20世紀功利主義雖然經過摩爾 (G.E. Moore) 的批判，但英美哲學家與英國自然科學家兼倫理學家圖爾明(Stephen Edelston Toulmin)、牛津大學的諾埃爾-史密斯 (Patrick Nowell-Smith)、厄姆森 (J.O. Urmson)以及澳大利亞的斯馬特 (J. J. C. Smart)等人仍為功利主義辯護。
主要概念
功利主義認為人應該做出能「達到最大善」的行為，所謂最大善的計算則必須依靠此行為所涉及的每個個體之苦樂感覺的總和，其中每個個體都被視為具相同份量，且快樂與痛苦是能夠換算的，痛苦僅是「負的快樂」。不同於一般的倫理學說， 功利主義不考慮一個人行為的動機與手段，僅考慮一個行為的結果對最大快樂值的影響。能增加最大快樂值的即是善；反之即為惡。邊沁和米爾都認為：人類的行為 完全以快樂和痛苦為動機。米爾認為：人類行為的唯一目的是求得幸福，所以對幸福的促進就成為判斷人的一切行為的標準。派別
功利主義根據應用的方式可分為以下幾種：有人認為，普遍功利主義和規則功利主義本質上都屬於情境功利主義的一種。
應用
功利主義的影響甚為廣泛。它在法律、政治學、經濟學方面更有特別顯著的重要性。例如在懲罰方面，功利主義反對「一報還一報」的「報應」理論。功利主義者認為懲罰的基本原理是通過改造罪犯或保護社會不受罪犯破壞，從而避免發生更多的犯罪行為，同時也使其他人因懼怕受到懲罰而不敢犯罪。在政治哲學上，功利主義者贊成將民主作為使政府利益與公眾利益取得一致的一種方法。他們認為每個人的最大自由和其他人的同等自由是一致的。不過也有人因為強調政府利益的一面，而走向保守主義、甚至獨裁主義。另一方面，也有人因相信人性本善，認為最大的幸福是來自社會的根本變革，從而走向無政府主義的共產主義，如威廉·戈德溫。在經濟學上，所謂邊際效用分析學派如威廉姆·斯坦利·傑文斯，則是從邊沁那裡吸取了許多思想，所謂「福利經濟學」是以「比較愛好」代替「比較效用」，也表現功利主義的基本精神。在經濟政策上，早期的功利主義者傾向自由貿易，反對政府干涉。後期的功利主義者由於對私人企業的社會效率失去信心，又希望政府出面干涉來糾正私人企業的弊病。在當代的討論中，人們對倫理學語言的分析，以及對邊沁的「快樂計算」均已失去興趣；功利主義出現了種種修正的和複雜的形式。批判
功利主義的中心思想，即每個人都應該在任何可能的情況下促進幸福，並避免不幸，這看來是應予肯定的。但關鍵性的問題是：整個規範倫理學是否都可以根 據這個簡單的公式來分析。是否有超乎快樂與痛苦之外的價值值得重視。 如何衡量一個人吃了巧克力之後得到的快樂比別人多、少或者一樣？沒有方法來計算得到利益，也就沒有方法確定什麼行為是道德允許的。所以快樂利己主義在某種 程度上行不通。參考資料
- ^ 藝術與建築索引典—效益主義 於2011 年3 月14 日查閱
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本頁面最後修訂於2012年3月21日 (星期三) 09:38。
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http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hk/%E4%B9%89%E5%8A%A1%E4%BC%A6%E7%90%86%E5%AD%A6
義務倫理學
Deontological ethics
維基百科，自由的百科全書
不同於效益論考量的是行為的結
果，義務論考量的是行為的動機。義務論者認為，注重行為結果的行為幾乎都是感性所引起，常常是不可普遍化或是和行為預期的目標不一致的，「只有善意才足以
被稱為善」，善意表示它可以通過理性的判斷而不會自相矛盾，良善的行為來自良善的動機，所以必須考量行為是否出於理性規則而可普遍化。義務論有幾個特點：
顯見義務有以下幾種：
相對於規範倫理注重行為的原則，德行論（Virtue Ethics）強調的是行為者要有某些特質，換句話說，道德判斷是一個人依照他的某些良好品質人格去做選擇，實踐道德上應該做的事，不僅是符合眾人的期盼，更重要的是培養個人的人格。
- 行為的規則決定了它是否被實行，唯有來自不相矛盾的規則，才能普遍化而被實行，因此「在別人也會如此意願的情況下去實踐行為」。
- 實踐行為是彰顯了人的理性的價值，一件事如果它是出於理性的規則而被實行，那麼它就是道德上應該做的事，並且彰顯理性的價值是人的存在目的之一，因此「不要把人僅僅當做工具來利用，同時也要把它當成自身的目的來對待」。
- 一件事如果只是「符合規則」，那麼它是明智的，而不是道德的，容易有例外產生，可實行也可不實行，唯有「出於規則」，才能使人肯定理性價值的崇高與偉大，自動的服從規則使得行為必然被實行。
目錄 |
義務論的優點與缺點
優點
- 強調理性規則，能夠獲得普遍的認同而實行，並且容易遵循而被教導或學習。
- 注重理性的價值，能夠維護人的尊嚴，而不是僅僅利用他。
缺點
- 普遍化的規則並非能夠適用於所有情況，無法普遍化的例外情況反而容易常常被實行。
- 過於強調理性的力量，忽略由感性出發來驅使行為的人性，並且理性是否是人的唯一目的則是可疑的。
- 由動機來判定行為是否道德並沒提供實質性的基礎，除了當事人，行為的動機只能被推測而無法得知，行為被實踐通常只是符合規則而無法確定是否出於規則。
顯見義務有以下幾種：
- 忠誠（或忠實）：誠實、守承諾、履行契約。
- 補償：為自己不公正的行為對別人做出補償。
- 感恩：向別人表達感謝對自己的幫助。
- 公正：防止分配上的不均，使人無法獲得應得的結果。
- 慈善：幫助他人改善道德、智力和幸福的狀況。
- 自我改善：必須增進自己的道德、智力和幸福。
- 勿作惡（不害人）：不傷害他人、防止對他人的傷害。
- 始終按照更強烈的顯見義務去行動。
- 始終採取可壓倒顯見惡的最大顯見善的行為。
相對於規範倫理注重行為的原則，德行論（Virtue Ethics）強調的是行為者要有某些特質，換句話說，道德判斷是一個人依照他的某些良好品質人格去做選擇，實踐道德上應該做的事，不僅是符合眾人的期盼，更重要的是培養個人的人格。
參考
- 楊勝欽。道德判斷的方式。
本頁面最後修訂於2012年1月9日 (星期一) 19:03。
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
Consequentialism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences
of one's conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the
rightness of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a
morally right act (or omission) is one that will produce a good outcome,
or consequence.[citation needed]
Consequentialism is usually distinguished from deontological ethics (or deontology), in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behaviour itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also distinguished from virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the act (or omission) itself, and pragmatic ethics which treats morality like science: advancing socially over the course of many lifetimes, such that any moral criterion is subject to revision. Consequentialist theories differ in how they define moral goods.[citation needed]
Some argue that consequentialist and deontological theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, T.M. Scanlon advances the idea that human rights, which are commonly considered a "deontological" concept, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights.[1] Similarly, Robert Nozick argues for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do.[1]
John Stuart Mill, an influential liberal thinker of the 19th century and a teacher of utilitarianism, albeit his teachings are a bit different from Jeremy Bentham's philosophy
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[6] However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer are concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence "preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.
Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, Robert Nozick holds that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints", are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.[1] There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, Amartya Sen proposes a theory that recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.[1] That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.
One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist principle that what we should be concerned with is maximizing the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximize the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results).
Brad Hooker avoided this objection by not basing his form of rule-consequentialism on the ideal of maximizing the good. He writes:
"…the best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximise the good. The best argument for rule-consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties" [11]
Derek Parfit described Brad Hooker's book on rule-consequentialism Ideal Code, Real World as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories." [12]
One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones. A more strenuous version of negative consequentialism may actually require active intervention, but only to prevent harm from being done. An alternative theory (using the example of negative utilitarianism) is that some consider the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) to be more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious).[citation needed]
Teleological theories differ on the nature of the end that actions ought to promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek eudaimonia, "happiness") hold that the goal of ethics consists in some function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, and thus tend to emphasize the cultivation of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all action. These could be the classical virtues—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—that promoted the Greek ideal of man as the "rational animal", or the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—that distinguished the Christian ideal of man as a being created in the image of God.[citation needed]
Utilitarian-type theories hold that the end consists in an experience or feeling produced by the action. Hedonism, for example, teaches that this feeling is pleasure—either one's own, as in egoism (the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes), or everyone's, as in universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism (the 19th-century English philosophers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick), with its formula of the "greatest pleasure of the greatest number."[citation needed]
Other utilitarian-type views include the claims that the end of action is survival and growth, as in evolutionary ethics (the 19th-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer); the experience of power, as in despotism (the 16th-century Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli and the 19th-century German Friedrich Nietzsche); satisfaction and adjustment, as in pragmatism (20th-century American philosophers Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey); and freedom, as in existentialism (the 20th-century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre).[citation needed]
The chief problem for eudaemonist theories is to show that leading a life of virtue will also be attended by happiness—by the winning of the goods regarded as the chief end of action. That Job should suffer and Socrates and Jesus die while the wicked prosper, then seems unjust. Eudaemonists generally reply that the universe is moral and that, in Socrates' words, “No evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death,” or, in Jesus' words, “But he who endures to the end will be saved.”[citation needed]
Utilitarian theories, on the other hand, must answer the charge that ends do not justify the means. The problem arises in these theories because they tend to separate the achieved ends from the action by which these ends were produced. One implication of utilitarianism is that one's intention in performing an act may include all of its foreseen consequences. The goodness of the intention then reflects the balance of the good and evil of these consequences, with no limits imposed upon it by the nature of the act itself—even if it be, say, the breaking of a promise or the execution of an innocent man. Utilitarianism, in answering this charge, must show either that what is apparently immoral is not really so or that, if it really is so, then closer examination of the consequences will bring this fact to light. Ideal utilitarianism (G.E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall) tries to meet the difficulty by advocating a plurality of ends and including among them the attainment of virtue itself, which, as John Stuart Mill affirmed, "may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good."[citation needed]
However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be understood to be entirely antagonistic. Consequentialist theories can consider character in several ways. For example, the effects on the character of the agent or any other people involved in an action may be regarded as a relevant consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism that argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.[citation needed][clarification needed]
Max Weber
Bernard Williams has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that is said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents—since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.[citation needed]
Some consequentialists—most notably Peter Railton—have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects.[1]
Consequentialism is usually distinguished from deontological ethics (or deontology), in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behaviour itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also distinguished from virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the act (or omission) itself, and pragmatic ethics which treats morality like science: advancing socially over the course of many lifetimes, such that any moral criterion is subject to revision. Consequentialist theories differ in how they define moral goods.[citation needed]
Some argue that consequentialist and deontological theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, T.M. Scanlon advances the idea that human rights, which are commonly considered a "deontological" concept, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights.[1] Similarly, Robert Nozick argues for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do.[1]
Contents |
Consequentialist philosophies
State consequentialism
Main article: Mohist consequentialism
Mohist consequentialism, also known as state consequentialism,[3] is an ethical theory which evaluates the moral worth of an action based on how much it contributes to the stability of a state.[3] According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BC, is the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare."[4] Unlike utilitarianism, which views pleasure as a moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are... order, material wealth, and increase in population".[5] During Mozi's era, war and famines were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a harmonious society. The "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to basic needs like shelter and clothing, and the "order" of Mohist consequentialism refers to Mozi's stance against warfare and violence, which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability.[2] Stanford sinologist David Shepherd Nivison, in the The Cambridge History of Ancient China, writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then more production and wealth... if people have plenty, they would be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically."[5] In contrast to Bentham, Mozi did not believe that individual happiness was important, the consequences of the state outweigh the consequences of individual actions.[5]What is the purpose of houses? It is to protect us from the wind and cold of winter, the heat and rain of summer, and to keep out robbers and thieves. Once these ends have been secured, that is all. Whatever does not contribute to these ends should be eliminated.[2]—Mozi, Mozi (5th century BC) Ch 20
Utilitarianism
Main article: Utilitarianism
Summarily, Jeremy Bentham states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their interests take precedence over their fears, and their interests are carried out in accordance with how people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. "Happiness" on this account is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.[citation needed]Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think...— Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) Ch I, p 1
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[6] However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer are concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence "preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.
Ethical egoism
Main article: Ethical egoism
Ethical egoism
can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the
consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any
other result. Thus, egoism will prescribe actions that may be
beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like
Henry Sidgwick, argue that a certain degree of egoism promotes
the general welfare of society for two reasons: because individuals
know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an
austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.[7]Ethical altruism
Main article: Altruism (ethics)
Ethical altruism
can be seen as a consequentialist ethic which prescribes that an
individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone
except for himself.[8] This was advocated by Auguste Comte, who coined the term "altruism," and whose ethics can be summed up in the phrase: Live for others.[9]Rule consequentialism
In general, consequentialist theories focus on actions. However, this need not be the case. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile deontology and consequentialism—and in some cases, this is stated as a criticism of rule consequentialism.[10] Like deontology, rule consequentialism holds that moral behavior involves following certain rules. However, rule consequentialism chooses rules based on the consequences that the selection of those rules have. Rule consequentialism exists in the forms of rule utilitarianism and rule egoism.Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, Robert Nozick holds that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints", are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.[1] There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, Amartya Sen proposes a theory that recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.[1] That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.
One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist principle that what we should be concerned with is maximizing the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximize the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results).
Brad Hooker avoided this objection by not basing his form of rule-consequentialism on the ideal of maximizing the good. He writes:
"…the best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximise the good. The best argument for rule-consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties" [11]
Derek Parfit described Brad Hooker's book on rule-consequentialism Ideal Code, Real World as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories." [12]
Motive consequentialism
Another consequentialist version is motive consequentialism which looks if the state of affairs that results from the motive to choose an action is better or at least as good as each of the alternative state of affairs that would have resulted from alternative actions. This version gives relevance to the motive of an act and links it to its consequences. An act can therefore not be wrong if the decision to act was based on a right motive. A possible inference is, that one can not be blamed for mistaken judgements if the motivation was to do good.[13]Negative consequentialism
Most consequentialist theories focus on promoting some sort of good consequences. However, one could equally well lay out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences. (Negative utilitarianism is an actual example.)One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones. A more strenuous version of negative consequentialism may actually require active intervention, but only to prevent harm from being done. An alternative theory (using the example of negative utilitarianism) is that some consider the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) to be more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious).[citation needed]
Teleological ethics
Teleological ethics (Greek telos, “end”; logos, “science”) is an ethical theory that holds that the ends or consequences of an act determine whether an act is good or evil. Teleological theories are often discussed in opposition to deontological ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves are inherently good or evil, regardless of the consequences of acts.[citation needed]Teleological theories differ on the nature of the end that actions ought to promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek eudaimonia, "happiness") hold that the goal of ethics consists in some function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, and thus tend to emphasize the cultivation of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all action. These could be the classical virtues—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—that promoted the Greek ideal of man as the "rational animal", or the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—that distinguished the Christian ideal of man as a being created in the image of God.[citation needed]
Utilitarian-type theories hold that the end consists in an experience or feeling produced by the action. Hedonism, for example, teaches that this feeling is pleasure—either one's own, as in egoism (the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes), or everyone's, as in universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism (the 19th-century English philosophers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick), with its formula of the "greatest pleasure of the greatest number."[citation needed]
Other utilitarian-type views include the claims that the end of action is survival and growth, as in evolutionary ethics (the 19th-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer); the experience of power, as in despotism (the 16th-century Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli and the 19th-century German Friedrich Nietzsche); satisfaction and adjustment, as in pragmatism (20th-century American philosophers Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey); and freedom, as in existentialism (the 20th-century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre).[citation needed]
The chief problem for eudaemonist theories is to show that leading a life of virtue will also be attended by happiness—by the winning of the goods regarded as the chief end of action. That Job should suffer and Socrates and Jesus die while the wicked prosper, then seems unjust. Eudaemonists generally reply that the universe is moral and that, in Socrates' words, “No evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death,” or, in Jesus' words, “But he who endures to the end will be saved.”[citation needed]
Utilitarian theories, on the other hand, must answer the charge that ends do not justify the means. The problem arises in these theories because they tend to separate the achieved ends from the action by which these ends were produced. One implication of utilitarianism is that one's intention in performing an act may include all of its foreseen consequences. The goodness of the intention then reflects the balance of the good and evil of these consequences, with no limits imposed upon it by the nature of the act itself—even if it be, say, the breaking of a promise or the execution of an innocent man. Utilitarianism, in answering this charge, must show either that what is apparently immoral is not really so or that, if it really is so, then closer examination of the consequences will bring this fact to light. Ideal utilitarianism (G.E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall) tries to meet the difficulty by advocating a plurality of ends and including among them the attainment of virtue itself, which, as John Stuart Mill affirmed, "may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good."[citation needed]
Acts and Omissions, and the 'Act and Omissions Doctrine'
Since pure consequentialism holds that an action is to be judged solely by its result, most consequentialist theories hold that a deliberate action is no different from a deliberate decision not to act. This contrasts with the Acts and Omissions Doctrine, which is upheld by some medical ethicists and some religions: it asserts there is a significant moral distinction between acts and deliberate non-actions which lead to the same outcome. This contrast is brought out in issues such as voluntary euthanasia - a pure consequentialist would see no moral difference between allowing a patient to die by, for example, withholding food; switching off their life-support machine; or actively killing them with harmful drugs.Issues in consequentialism
Action guidance
One important characteristic of many normative moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the responsibility of the agent.[citation needed]The ideal observer
One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an altruistic (selfless) account of consequentialism, is to employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. John Rawls, a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an ideal observer.[1] The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an omniscient observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.[citation needed]The real observer
In practice, it is very difficult, and at times arguably impossible, to adopt the point of view of an ideal observer. Individual moral agents do not know everything about their particular situations, and thus do not know all the possible consequences of their potential actions. For this reason, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require agents to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation.[14] However, if this approach is naïvely adopted, then moral agents who, for example, recklessly fail to reflect on their situation, and act in a way that brings about terrible results, could be said to be acting in a morally justifiable way. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, it could be argued that there is a moral imperative for an agent to inform himself as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better-informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.[citation needed]Consequences for whom
Moral action always has an effect on certain people or things, the consequences. Various kinds of consequentialism can be differentiated by beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"[citation needed]Agent-focused or agent-neutral
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between theories that demand that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or motivation and theories that demand that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives. These are called "agent-focused" and "agent-neutral" theories respectively. Agent-neutral consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, an actor's personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action the actor should take. Agent-focused consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that Peter Railton outlines, the actor might be concerned with the general welfare, but the actor is more concerned with the immediate welfare of herself and her friends and family.[1] These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests.[citation needed] For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual but bad for them as a citizen of their town.Human-centered?
Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. Jeremy Bentham, who is regarded as the founder of Utilitarianism, argues that animals can experience pleasure and pain, thus demanding that 'non-human animals' should be a serious object of moral concern.[15] More recently, Peter Singer has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them.[16] Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, any more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.Kinds of consequences
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to utilitarianism, a good action is one that results in an increase in pleasure, and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is eudaimonic consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in material equality or political liberty instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally.Virtue ethics
Consequentialism can also be contrasted with aretaic moral theories such as virtue ethics. Whereas consequentialist theories posit that consequences of action should be the primary focus of our thinking about ethics, virtue ethics insists that it is the character rather than the consequences of actions that should be the focal point. Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories totally disregard the development and importance of moral character. For example, Philippa Foot argues that consequences in themselves have no ethical content, unless it has been provided by a virtue such as benevolence.[1]However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be understood to be entirely antagonistic. Consequentialist theories can consider character in several ways. For example, the effects on the character of the agent or any other people involved in an action may be regarded as a relevant consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism that argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.[citation needed][clarification needed]
Ultimate End
The Ultimate end is a concept in the moral philosophy of Max Weber, in which individuals act in a faithful, rather than rational, manner.[citation needed]We must be clear about the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an "ethic of ultimate ends" or to an "ethic of responsibility." This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism. Naturally nobody says that. However, there is an abysmal contract between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends—that, is in religious terms, "the Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord"—and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action."
Etymology
The term "consequentialism" was coined by G. E. M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, to describe what she saw as the central error of certain moral theories, such as those propounded by Mill and Sidgwick.[17]Criticisms
G. E. M. Anscombe objects to consequentialism on the grounds that it does not provide guidance in what one ought to do because there is no distinction between consequences that are foreseen and those that are intended (see Principle of double effect).[17][Full citation needed]Bernard Williams has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that is said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents—since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.[citation needed]
Some consequentialists—most notably Peter Railton—have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects.[1]
Notable consequentialists
- R. M. Adams (born 1937)
- Jonathan Baron (born 1944)
- Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)
- Richard B. Brandt (1910–1997)
- Milton Friedman (1912–2006)
- Siddhārtha Gautama, the Buddha (c.563 BCE-483 BCE)
- William Godwin (1756–1836)
- R.M. Hare (1919–2002)
- John Harsanyi (1920–2000)
- Brad Hooker
- Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746)
- Shelly Kagan
- Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527)
- James Mill (1773–1836)
- John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)
- G.E. Moore (1873–1958)
- Mozi (470 BCE – 391 BCE)
- Philip Pettit (born 1945)
- Peter Railton (born 1950)
- Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900)
- Peter Singer (born 1946)
- J. J. C. Smart (born 1920)
See also
- Rule consequentialism
- Doctrine of mental reservation
- Demandingness objection
- Dharmayuddha
- Utilitarianism
- Welfarism
Further reading
- Darwall, Stephen (Ed.) (2002). Consequentialism. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-23108-0.
- Goodman, Charles (2009). Consequences of Compassion: An interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-537519-0.
- Honderich, Ted (2003). Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness.
- Portmore, Douglas W. (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-979453-9.
- Scheffler, Samuel (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-823511-8.
References
- ^ a b c d e f g h Scheffler, Samuel (Ed.) (1988). Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875073-4.
- ^ a b Van Norden, Bryan W. (2011). Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-60384-468-0.
- ^ a b Ivanhoe, P.J.; Van Norden, Bryan William (2005). Readings in classical Chinese philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 60. ISBN 978-0-87220-780-6. ""he advocated a form of state consequentialism, which sought to maximize three basic goods: the wealth, order, and population of the state"
- ^ Fraser, Chris, "Mohism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Edward N. Zalta.
- ^ a b c Loewe, Michael; Shaughnessy, Edward L. (1999). The Cambridge History of Ancient China. Cambridge University Press. p. 761. ISBN 978-0-521-47030-8.
- ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2.
- ^ Sidgwick, Henry (1907). The Method of Ethics. NY: Dover (1981). ISBN 0-915145-28-6.[dead link]
- ^ "Ethics" by James Fisher and Bradley Dowdwen, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1]
- ^ Moran, Gabriel Christian Religion and National Interests
- ^ Bernard Williams, "Utilitarianism" in his Morality, Cambridge University Press 1993
- ^ Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 101.
- ^ Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World Oxford University Press, new edition 2002, back cover [2]
- ^ Adams, R.M. 1976. Motive Utilitarianism, Journal of Philosophy, 73: 467-81.
- ^ Mackie, J. L. (1990). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-013558-8.
- ^ Bentham, Jeremy (1996). An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820516-6.[dead link]
- ^ Singer, Peter (2002). Helga Kuhse, ed.. ed. Unsanctifying Human Life. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-22507-2.
- ^ a b Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). "Modern Moral Philosophy". Philosophy (1958) 33 (124): 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0031819100037943.
External links
 |
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Means and ends |
- Consequentialism entry by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Rule Consequentialism entry by Brad Hooker in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This page was last modified on 15 May 2012 at 16:32.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics
Virtue ethics
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The difference between these four approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lying — though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential "good" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about one's character and moral behavior. As such, lying would be made in a case-by-case basis that would be based on factors such as personal benefit, group benefit, and intentions (as to whether they are benevolent or malevolent).
In contrast, an ethical pragmatist would judge the morality of the lie based not upon properties of the individual moral agent, but upon those of their society. The lie would be deemed immoral on the grounds that their society currently deems it immoral for various reasons (which may include the application of virtue ethics, consequentialism and/or deontology, as well as other reasons yet to be explicated), and that society is progressing morally, much as it progresses scientific knowledge (potentially over many lifetimes).
Contents |
Overview
Although concern for virtue appears in several philosophical traditions, in the West the roots of the tradition lie in the work of Plato and Aristotle, and even today the tradition’s key concepts derive from ancient Greek philosophy. These concepts include arete (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom), and eudaimonia (flourishing). In the West virtue ethics was the prevailing approach to ethical thinking in the ancient and medieval periods. The tradition suffered an eclipse during the early modern period, as Aristotelianism fell out of favour in the West. Virtue theory returned to prominence in Western philosophical thought in the 20th century, and is today one of the three dominant approaches to normative theories (the other two being deontology and consequentialism).[1] Virtue theory is not actually in conflict with deontology or teleology: those two viewpoints deal with which actions a person should take in any given scenario, whereas virtue theorists simply argue that developing morally desirable virtues for their own sake will help aid moral actions when such decisions need to be made.While virtue ethics was born with Plato and Aristotle, their forms of virtue ethics are by no means the only ones. What virtue ethics refers to, rather, is a collection of normative ethical philosophies that place an emphasis on being rather than doing. Another way to say this is that in virtue ethics, morality stems from the identity and/or character of the individual, rather than being a reflection of the actions (or consequences thereof) of the individual. Today, there is a great amount of debate among various adherents of virtue ethics about what specific virtues are morally praiseworthy. However, the one thing they all agree upon is that morality comes as a result of intrinsic virtues—this is the common link that unites the sometimes disparate normative philosophies into the field known as virtue ethics. Plato and Aristotle's treatment of virtues is by no means the same however. For Plato, virtue is effectively an end to be sought, for which a friend might be a useful means. For Aristotle, the virtues function more as means to safeguard human relations, particularly authentic friendship, without which one's quest for happiness is frustrated.
Distinctions
Virtue ethics can be contrasted to deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics by an examination of the other two (the three being together the most predominant contemporary normative ethical theories). Deontological ethics, sometimes referred to as duty ethics, places the emphasis on adhering to ethical principles or duties. How these duties are defined, however, is often a point of contention and debate in deontological ethics. One of the predominant rule schemes utilized by deontologists is the Divine Command Theory. Deontology also depends, at least partially, upon meta-ethical realism, in that it postulates the existence of moral absolutes that make an action moral, regardless of circumstances. For more information on deontological ethics refer to the work of Immanuel Kant. The next predominant school of thought in normative ethics is consequentialism. While deontology places the emphasis on doing one's duty, which is established by some kind of moral imperative (in other words, the emphasis is on obedience to some higher moral absolute), consequentialism bases the morality of an action upon the consequences of the outcome. Instead of saying that one has a moral duty to abstain from murder, a consequentialist would say that we should abstain from murder because it causes undesirable effects. The main contention here is what outcomes should/can be identified as objectively desirable. The Greatest Happiness Principle of John Stuart Mill is one of the most commonly adopted criteria. Mill asserts that our determinant of the desirability of an action is the net amount of happiness it brings, the number of people it brings it to, and the duration of the happiness. He also tries to delineate classes of happiness, some being preferable to others, but there is a great deal of difficulty in classifying such concepts. For a more complete outline of the niceties of Mill's classification system see the page on utilitarianism or read Mill's works Utilitarianism, Defense of Utilitarianism, and On Liberty. Examining the meta-ethical theories of naturalism, upon which many consequentialist theories rely, may provide further clarification. Having looked at the other two normative ethical theories we come at last to virtue ethics.As stated before, deontology focuses on adhering to ethical duties, while consequentialism focuses on the outcomes (consequences) of actions. Here virtue ethics differs in that the focus is instead upon being rather than doing. A virtue ethics philosopher will identify virtues, desirable characteristics, that the moral or virtuous person embodies. Possessing these virtues, in virtue ethics, is what makes one moral, and one's actions are a mere reflection of one's inner morality. To the virtue philosopher, action cannot be used as a demarcation of morality, because a virtue encompasses more than just a simple selection of action. Instead, it is about a way of being that would cause the person exhibiting the virtue to make a certain "virtuous" choice consistently in each situation. There is a great deal of disagreement within virtue ethics over what are virtues and what are not. There are also difficulties in identifying what is the "virtuous" action to take in all circumstances, and how does one define a virtue?
Consequentialist and deontological theories often still employ the term 'virtue', but in a restricted sense, namely as a tendency or disposition to adhere to the system's principles or rules. These very different senses of what constitutes virtue, hidden behind the same word, are a potential source of confusion. This disagreement over the meaning of virtue points to a larger conflict between virtue theory and its philosophical rivals. A system of virtue theory is only intelligible if it is teleological: that is, if it includes an account of the purpose (telos) of human life, or in popular language, the meaning of life.[citation needed] Obviously, strong claims about the purpose of human life, or of what the good life for human beings is, will be highly controversial. Virtue theory's necessary commitment to a teleological account of human life thus puts the tradition in sharp tension with other dominant approaches to normative ethics, which, because they focus on actions, do not bear this burden.[citation needed]
Achieving eudaimonia
Eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία) is a state variously translated from Greek as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'blessedness', and in the context of virtue ethics, 'human flourishing'.[2] Eudaimonia in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective, state. It characterizes the well-lived life. According to Aristotle, the most prominent exponent of eudaimonia in the Western philosophical tradition, eudaimonia is the proper goal of human life. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality -- reason -- as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of eudaimonia was an activity that could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community—the polis or city-state.Although eudaimonia was first popularized by Aristotle, it now belongs to the tradition of virtue theories generally. For the virtue theorist, eudaimonia describes that state achieved by the person who lives the proper human life, an outcome that can be reached by practicing the virtues. A virtue is a habit or quality that allows the bearer to succeed at his, her, or its purpose. The virtue of a knife, for example, is sharpness; among the virtues of a racehorse is speed. Thus to identify the virtues for human beings, one must have an account of what the human purpose is. There is, and always has been, sharp disagreement on this question: thus, as Alasdair MacIntyre observed in After Virtue, though thinkers as diverse as Homer, Aristotle, the authors of the New Testament, Thomas Aquinas, and Benjamin Franklin have all proposed lists, and sometimes theories of the interrelation, of the virtues, these do not always overlap.[citation needed]
Aristotle categorized the virtues as moral and intellectual. Aristotle identified nine intellectual virtues, the most important of which was wisdom; sophia (theoretical wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). The other eight moral virtues include:
Aristotle argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean (see Golden Mean) between two corresponding vices.
Historical origins and development
Like much of the Western tradition, virtue theory seems to have originated in ancient Greek philosophy . Discussion of what were known as the Four Cardinal Virtues - wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance - can be found in Plato's Republic. The virtues also figure prominently in Aristotle's moral theory (see below). Virtue theory was inserted into the study of history by moralistic historians such as Livy, Plutarch, and Tacitus. The Greek idea of the virtues was passed on in Roman philosophy through Cicero and later incorporated into Christian moral theology by St. Ambrose of Milan. During the scholastic period, the most comprehensive consideration of the virtues from a theological perspective was provided by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae and his Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.The tradition was eclipsed in the Renaissance, and throughout the early modern period, when the Aristotelian synthesis of ethics and metaphysics fell into disfavour. Though the tradition receded into the background of European philosophical thought in these centuries, the term "virtue" remained current during this period, and in fact appears prominently in the tradition of classical republicanism or classical liberalism. This tradition was prominent in the intellectual life of 16th-century Italy, as well as seventeenth- and 18th-century Britain and America; indeed the term "virtue" appears frequently in the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, David Hume, the republicans of the English Civil War period, the 18th-century English Whigs, and the prominent figures among the Scottish Enlightenment and the American Founding Fathers. Despite this common term, classical republicanism should not be conflated with virtue theory, as the two philosophical traditions draw from different sources and often address different concerns. Where virtue theory traces its roots to Aristotle, classical republicanism draws primarily on Tacitus.
Virtue theory emphasizes Aristotle's belief in the polis as the acme of political organization, and the role of the virtues in enabling human beings to flourish in that environment. Classical republicanism in contrast emphasizes Tacitus's concern that power and luxury can corrupt individuals and destroy liberty, as Tacitus perceived in the transformation of the Roman republic into an empire; virtue for classical republicans is a shield against this sort of corruption and a means to preserve the good life one has, rather than a means by which to achieve the good life one does not yet have. Another way to put the distinction between the two traditions is that virtue ethics relies on Aristotle's fundamental distinction between the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-should-be, while classical republicanism relies on the Tacitean distinction of the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-is-at-risk-of-becoming.[3]
Contemporary 'Aretaic turn'
Although some Enlightenment philosophers (e.g. Hume) continued to emphasize the virtues, with the ascendancy of utilitarianism and deontology, virtue theory moved to the margins of Western philosophy. The contemporary revival of virtue theory is frequently traced to the philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe's 1958 essay, 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. Following this:- the 1976 paper "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Michael Stocker summarises the main aretaic criticisms of deontological and consequentialist ethics.[4]
- Philippa Foot, who published a collection of essays in 1978 entitled Virtues and Vices.
- After Virtue and the 1990 Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry by Alasdair MacIntyre
- philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has made an effort to reconstruct a virtue-based theory in dialogue with the problems of modern and postmodern thought.
- Paul Ricoeur has accorded an important place to Aristotelian teleological ethics in his hermeneutical phenomenology of the subject, most notably in his book Oneself as Another.
- theologian Stanley Hauerwas has also found the language of virtue quite helpful in his own project.
- Rosalind Hursthouse has published On Virtue Ethics.
- Roger Crisp and Michael Slote have edited a collection of important essays titled Virtue Ethics
- Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have employed virtue theory in theorizing the capability approach to international development.
Aretaic approaches to morality, epistemology, and jurisprudence have been the subject of intense debates. One criticism that is frequently made focuses on the problem of guidance; opponents, such as Robert Louden in his seminal article "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," question whether the idea of a virtuous moral actor, believer, or judge can provide the guidance necessary for action, belief formation, or the decision of legal disputes.
Non-Western tradition
Non-Western moral and religious philosophies, such as Confucianism, also incorporate ideas that may appear similar to those developed by the ancient Greeks. Like ancient Greek ethics, Chinese ethical thought makes an explicit connection between virtue and statecraft. However, where the Greeks focused on the interior orientation of the soul, Confucianism's definition of virtue emphasizes interpersonal relations. Normally when the term virtue theory is used, it is in reference to the western conception of virtue theory, rather than any of the schools of East Asian ethical thought.Nick Gier in Buddhist Ethics as Virtue Ethics compares Buddha's ethical teachings to Aristotle's: "Like Greek virtue ethics, Buddhist ethics is also humanistic and thoroughly personalist."[5]
Damien Keown devotes a great deal of his work to debunking claims that Buddhism is Utilitarian in nature. His work then goes on to examine the structure of Buddhist Ethics, focusing specifically on morality (Pali: siila). His conclusion is that Buddhist Ethics most closely resembles the ancient Greek virtue ethics found in Aristotle.
James Whitehill in Buddhist Ethics in Western Context: The Virtues Approach says: "Buddhism's legitimation in the West can be partially met by demonstrating that Buddhist morality is a virtue-oriented, character-based, community-focused ethics, commensurate with the Western 'ethics of virtue' tradition."[6]
Criticisms
Some criticize the theory in relation to the difficulty involved with establishing the nature of the virtues. Different people, cultures and societies often have vastly different opinions on what constitutes a virtue.- For example, regarding what are the most important virtues, Aristotle proposed the nine listed earlier (just above Historical origins): wisdom; prudence; justice; fortitude; courage; liberality; magnificence; magnanimity; temperance. In contrast, one modern-era philosopher proposed as the four cardinal virtues: ambition/humility; love; courage; and honesty.[7]
- As another example, regarding virtues once supposedly applicable to women, many would have once considered a virtuous woman to be quiet, servile, and industrious. This conception of female virtue no longer holds true in many modern societies (see also cultural relativism). Proponents of virtue theory sometimes respond to this objection by arguing that a central feature of a virtue is its universal applicability. In other words, any character trait defined as a virtue must reasonably be universally regarded as a virtue for all sentient beings. According to this view, it is inconsistent to claim for example servility as a female virtue, while at the same time not proposing it as a male one.
Another objection to virtue theory is that the school does not focus on what sorts of actions are morally permitted and which ones are not, but rather on what sort of qualities someone ought to foster in order to become a good person. In other words, while some virtue theorists may not condemn, for example, murder as an inherently immoral or impermissible sort of action, they may argue that someone who commits a murder is severely lacking in several important virtues, such as compassion and fairness. Still, antagonists of the theory often object that this particular feature of the theory makes virtue ethics useless as a universal norm of acceptable conduct suitable as a base for legislation. Some virtue theorists concede this point, but respond by opposing the very notion of legitimate legislative authority instead, effectively advocating some form of anarchism as the political ideal. Others argue that laws should be made by virtuous legislators. Still others argue that it is possible to base a judicial system on the moral notion of virtues rather than rules.
Some virtue theorists might respond to this overall objection with the notion of a "bad act" also being an act characteristic of vice[citation needed]. That is to say that those acts that do not aim at virtue, or stray from virtue, would constitute our conception of "bad behavior". Although not all virtue ethicists agree to this notion, this is one way the virtue ethicist can re-introduce the concept of the "morally impermissible". One could raise objection with Foot that she is committing an argument from ignorance by postulating that what is not virtuous is unvirtuous. In other words, just because an action or person 'lacks of evidence' for virtue does not, all else constant, imply that said action or person is unvirtuous.
Applications
Virtue ethics has a number of applications. For instance, within the field of social ethics, Deirdre McCloskey[8] argues that virtue ethics can provide a basis for a balanced approach to understanding capitalism and capitalist societies. Within the field of philosophy of education, James Page[9] argues that virtue ethics can provide a rationale and foundation for peace education. Thomas Alured Faunce has argued that whistleblowing in the healthcare setting would be more respected within clinical governance pathways if it had a firmer academic foundation in virtue ethics.[10][11] He has argued that whistleblowing should have been expressly supported in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.[12]See also
References
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This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (June 2008) |
- ^ Hursthouse, R. (1999). Introduction. In On Virtue Ethics (pp. 1-24). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ^ Pojman, L.P. & Fieser, J. (2009). Virtue Theory. In Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (pp. 146-169). (6th ed.) Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- ^ J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
- ^ Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14, On Motives and Morals (Aug. 12, 1976), pp. 453–466 JSTOR doi:10.2307/2025782
- ^ Buddhist Ethics as Virtue Ethics
- ^ Buddhist Ethics in Western Context: The Virtues Approach
- ^ Kaufmann, W., 1961. The Faith Of A Heretic. Doubleday & Co., pages 317-338.
- ^ McCloskey, D. The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. (2007) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-55664-2.
- ^ Page, James S. (2008) Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations. Charlotte: Information Age Publishing. ISBN 978-1-59311-889-1.
- ^ Faunce TA Developing and Teaching the Virtue-Ethics Foundations of Healthcare Whistle Blowing Monash Bioethics Review 2004; 23(4): 41-55
- ^ Faunce TA and Jefferys S. Whistleblowing and Scientific Misconduct: Renewing Legal and Virtue Ethics Foundations Journal of Medicine and Law 2007, 26 (3): 567-84
- ^ Faunce TA and Nasu H. Normative Foundations of Technology Transfer and Transnational Benefit Principles in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human RightsJournal of Medicine and Philosophy , 0 : 1 – 26, 2009 doi:10.1093/jmp/jhp021
Further reading
- Crisp, Roger; Slote, Michael (1997). Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Darwall, ed., Stephen (2003). Virtue Ethics. Oxford: B. Blackwell.
- Devettere, Raymond J. (2002). Introduction to Virtue Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Gardiner, ed., Stephen M. (2005). Virtue Ethics, Old and New. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind (2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Swanton, Christine (2003). Virtue Ethics: a Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, Richard (2002). An Introduction to Virtue Ethics. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle by Jiyuan Yu
External links
- Virtue Ethics entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry by Rosalind Hursthouse;
- Moral Character entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry by Marcia Homiak.
- Virtue Ethics - summary, criticisms and how to apply the theory
- Legal theory lexicon: Virtue ethics by Larry Solum.
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Ethics
- A clickable list of Virtues with definitions and famous quotes.
- The Four Virtues
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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This page was last modified on 4 May 2012 at 14:17.
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